Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias: An Empirical Investigation by James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller
Recent findings have re-emphasized an old puzzle: far too much of the
variation in trade volume across country pairs is accounted for by distance
and border effects (Frankel, Stein and Wei 1998; Helliwell 1998; McCallum
1995).  Distance is more important than can plausibly be explained by
transportation costs (Grossman 1998; but also see Hummels 1998). Borders
matter far more than can be explained by tariffs, quotas, and formal
impediments to trade.  Informal impediments and hidden transactions costs
may explain these results.  Understanding such hidden costs would improve
policy design and stimulate progress in theoretical models of trade and
development.  This paper focuses on insecurity as one source of hidden costs.
Anecdotal evidence of the importance of insecurity abounds. A survey
undertaken by the World Bank between August 1996 and January 1997
summarizes such stories well.  Table 1 shows the ranking in order of
importance of “the obstacles for doing business,” based on responses by 3685
firms located in 69 countries. It is not surprising that firms should complain
about taxes; it is remarkable, however, that corruption should rank as the
second most import obstacle to business worldwide, with crime and theft not
far behind.  Complaints about trade regulations, currency and price controls,
and labor and environmental regulations appear relatively insignificant.
This paper sets out a structural model of insecure trade and fits it to
1996 trade flows. Our results show not only that insecurity matters, but how
much it matters and to whom it matters.  Our structural modeling approach
offers some insight into why insecurity matters.
We model two types of insecurity, one arising from predation (theft,
corruption, extortion) and the other arising from imperfect contract
enforcement.  Each is shown to imply a price markup analogous to a hidden
tax on trade.  When predation takes the form of theft, the markup is
determined by the probability that a particular shipment will be hijacked.
When predation takes the form of  bribes, the markup is equal to the
proportion of the value of each shipment which shippers expect to lose.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 2
These are equivalent when risks can be diversified through insurance or by
making a large number of small shipments subject to independent risks.
Imperfect contract enforcement leads to a slightly different markup. When
entry into the international market involves sunk costs, imperfect contract
enforcement exposes shippers to the holdup problem even when the
investment is not partner-specific.  In this case, the exogenous probability of
enforcement determines the size of the price markup.
Table 1. Rankings of “Obstacles for Doing Business”
Worldwide
Sample




Crime and Theft 5
Inflation 6
Uncertainty of Cost of Regulations 7
Policy Instability 8
Labor Regulations 9
Regulations on Foreign Trade 10
Safety or Environmental Regulations 11
Start-up Regulations 12
Foreign Currency Regulations 13
Price Controls 14
Terrorism 15
Source: Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, 1997, p. 70.
Using data on institutional quality compiled by the World Economic
Forum, we show that trade expands dramatically when it is supported by
strong institutions – specifically, by a legal system capable of enforcing
commercial contracts and by transparent and impartial formulation and
implementation of government economic policy.  We estimate, for example,
that if the indexes of institutional quality associated with the Latin American
countries in our sample were to improve to the levels associated with the
European Union, Latin American trade would expand by 34%, other thingsTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 3
equal, outweighing the projected impact of a move to free trade. Attention to
the costs of insecurity may help in solving Trefler’s (1995) “mystery of the
missing trade” in embodied factor services.
We show that empirical models which ignore the security of exchange
suffer from an important omitted variables bias. We find very significant
“home bias,” an income elasticity of demand much less than one, when
institutional indicators enter the model; one calculation shows that the share
of total expenditure devoted to traded goods falls 3.5% when per capita
income rises 10%.  In contrast, when security is ignored, no home bias is
found; the positive impact of strong institutions is misattributed to high
income per capita, the included variable with which institutional quality is
correlated. The home bias effect reported here stands in contrast to recent
empirical work which has failed to reject homothetic preferences (Davis and
Weinstein 1998; Davis, Weinstein, Bradford and Shimpo 1997). Our work
leads us to echo Trefler (1995, p.1043), “the bias is important and must be
confronted theoretically and empirically.”
The stylized fact that high-income capital-abundant countries trade
disproportionately with each other rather than with low-income labor-
abundant countries has been used to motivate models based on product
differentiation rather than factor endowments, but insecurity provides an
alternative explanation. The price effect of good institutional support for
trade among high-income countries leads them to trade disproportionately
with one another.  This argument does not imply, counterfactually, that low-
income countries should also trade disproportionately with one another.
The paper begins by showing how insecurity translates into a price
markup.  The second section ties the price markup into import demand.  The
third section describes the data which are used to estimate the model in the
fourth section.  The fifth sections reports several checks on the robustness of
our results.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 4
1. Modeling the Security of Trade
Two types of insecurity can generate price markups equivalent to a
hidden tax on international trade.   A model of “predation” views shipments
as subject to attack by hijackers or corrupt officials.  A model of “contractual
insecurity” captures the impact of the holdup problem on shippers when
fixed costs are associated with entry into the international market and
contract enforcement is random. These are complementary rather than
competing models.  Each leads to a simple price markup which is a reduced
form function of exogenous variables.  Either model can motivate the
demand system estimated later in this paper.
Predation
Anderson and Marcouiller (1998) present a complete general
equilibrium model of predation, in which utility-maximizing agents
rationally allocate their labor across productive and predatory activities,
endogenously determining the probability of successful shipment. Here we
present a slightly simplified version of the model.
Thieves – or corrupt officials – attack shipments.  Any shipment which
is defended by less than the customary measures is identifiable as easy prey,
attacked with certainty, and completely lost.  Under these circumstances, all
shippers will take the normal defensive measures and thieves will attack
randomly.  The probability that a normally defended shipment from country i
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, and an exogenous technological parameter q.
1  The ability to diversify risk
makes p equivalent, from the shippers’ point of view, to a proportionalTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 5
insecurity tax of p on the value of every shipment.  This tax is bounded on
the unit interval, increasing in bandit labor and decreasing in defensive labor.
In this paper we treat defensive arrangements    Li
D
 as given.
2  We also





i å .  The endogenous allocation of bandits across countries then
determines    pi .  Bandits freely allocate themselves across countries in a
competitive equilibrium so as to maximize expected loot 
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where v i  is the volume of trade flowing through the border of country i.  The
reasonable assumption that uncoordinated bandits take trade volumes as
given greatly simplifies this problem.  Solving the first order conditions gives
the allocation of bandit labor to each country:
(1.2) Li
B =
pi 1- pi ( )vi




A bit of algebra produces the reduced form solution for    pi :
(1.3)
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where    wi  is country i’s share of total world trade.
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 denote the strength of a country’s institutions for the
defense of trade. Then:
(1.4)
     
pi = S  i wiS  i
i å
æ 
è  ç 
ö 
















If the probability of successfully crossing into country j is independent of the
probability of successfully leaving i, the proportion of all shipments from
                                                                                                                                                
1 The same function has been used in the context of non-anonymous predation by Grossman and
Kim (1995).
2 This is, of course, a major simplification.  See Anderson and Marcouiller (1998).Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 6
producers in j  which successfully reach their consumers in i  is given by:
(1.5)
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The probability of loss on this trade route,   1-pij ( ), determines the
transactions cost and the corresponding price markup associated with
insecurity.
Equation 1.5 can be extended to include other influences on pij .  When
the two countries share a common border (represented by a dummy    bij ) or a
common language (dummy    lij ),    pi  and    pj  may not be independent.  The risk
of theft might rise as the distance traveled rises, perhaps due to loss of
information about ways to avoid hazards.
3 Adding these variables and





























The price markup on imports by country i from country j relative to the
markup on imports by k from j  will reflect the relative probability of
successful shipment, as described in Section 2 below.
Contractual Insecurity
Insecurity in the form of imperfect contract enforcement generates a
price markup when fixed costs are associated with entry into the international
market.  Following Anderson and Young (1999), we model a market in which
for institutional reasons there is some exogenous probability  1-q ( ) that a
given contract may fail to be enforced. When contracts are not enforced, the
contracting parties engage in ex post bargaining, in which the sunk costs of
trade (all handling charges up to the point of sale) are ignored. Foreseeing thisTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 7
possibility, high cost traders are discouraged from entering the market. The
effect on trade can be modeled as a price markup equivalent to a tariff. The
sketch of the model we present here is necessarily cursory, serving only to
give the elements which yield a plausible reduced form which we take to our
empirical work.  See Anderson and Young (1999) for details.
Sunk costs are associated with entry into international trade.
4
International exchange occurs either according to the terms of a contract
negotiated prior to incurring the sunk costs or in a non-contracted market
into which those whose contracts are not enforced necessarily fall. We allow
traders without enforced contracts to match only once per trading period.
5  In
the non-contracted market, exchange occurs at the bargained price






1-v = vb +(1 -v)c
where b and c are the exogenously determined outside options (home prices)
for the buyer and seller and    w Î(0,1) is the bargaining strength of the seller.
In these circumstances, it is only by accident that the numbers of buyers
and sellers would be equal. Any unmatched trader will return home to
exchange at his outside option price. We focus in this development on the
excess demand case, in which some potential importers are unable to find
exporters to deal with.
The actual volume exchanged is that on the short side of the market,
read off the supply curve,       s[p
s(p
*,q,b)], where p
s is the equilibrium value of
the certainty equivalent price to suppliers, which can be shown to be a
reduced form function of the bargained price, the probability of enforcement
                                                                                                                                                
3  This is the only point at which we mention information costs, but we do not wish to deny their
importance.  For a provocative model of information costs and trade, see Casella and Rauch
(1998).
4 In the usual holdup model, these costs are relationship-specific: the exporter designs a
product for a particular importer. The outside option of the exporter is whatever resale value
this design has for others. Similarly the outside option of the importer is whatever price must
be paid for an equivalent design elsewhere. Here, we need not assume that the sunk costs are
relationship specific because we assume that search is so expensive that traders match only
once.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 8
and the outside option of the buyers. To obtain the “tariff equivalent” of the
imperfect enforcement we first define the hypothetical buyers’ price which
would clear the market at the actual trade volume:
      p
t(p
*,q,b) = {p|d[p]= s[p
s(p
*,q,b)].
Then the ad valorem tariff equivalent is
(1.7)










The ad valorem tariff equivalent is decreasing in q,  (see Anderson and
Young, 1999) hence better enforcement increases trade.
In our application, the assumed exogenous q varies across countries so
that country j’s exports face different markups in each country i.  The p* and b
arguments of    T × () are handled as follows.  The bargained price p* is a
weighted average of the sellers’ and buyers’ reservation prices. The seller’s
reservation price is set at unity by convention and is invariant across buyers.
The buyers’ reservation price b  is modeled as a reduced form function of
exogenous endowment variables.  Finally, the weights in the bargained price
are assumed to be equal for all country pairs, because in the absence of a
bargaining theory which can discriminate among countries, it seems best to
assume that 1-w is the same across buyers. Under these assumptions, the
security questionnaire data we use as proxies for q accurately pick up the effect
of differing security arrangements on price markups.
2. Import Demand in an Insecure World
The strength of a nation’s institutions affects the prices it must pay for
traded goods, as shown in the previous section. Import demand depends in
                                                                                                                                                
5 If rematching were possible, the trader who is faced with returning home to his outside option
could offer a better deal than the bargained price to someone about to accept the bargain. That
is, the outside option would be endogenous.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 9
turn on these prices and on the division of expenditure between traded and
non-traded goods.
Our model of import demand assumes two-stage budgeting.  Agents
first determine the proportion of total expenditure to allocate to traded goods.
In a second stage they allocate traded goods expenditure across individual
imports, which are differentiated by place of origin.
6   The first-stage
preferences are not restricted. Preferences across traded goods are CES and
identical across countries.
Under these assumptions, the impact of prices on demand in country i
for imports from country j  is given by:
(2.1)    mij =a jpij
-sP i
s-1xi
where    xi is country i’s total expenditure on traded goods,    pij  is the price of j’s
good in i with producer prices    pjj  normalized to one, 
     













CES price index for traded goods in i, s is the elasticity of substitution among
traded goods, and    aj  is that parametric expenditure share on j’s product
which is common to all importers.
The country’s total expenditure on traded goods,    xi, is some fraction f
of the country’s total income.  The traded goods expenditure share is modeled
as a reduced form function of the country’s income, population and traded
goods price index. A variety of static structural models yield such a function.
7
Anderson (1979) rationalized this reduced form with a model of perfect
competition and constant returns to scale. Bergstrand (1985, 1989) developed
the reduced form from a model with monopolistic competition and
economies of scale. The equilibrium price of the nontraded good is a reduced
                                                
6 Helliwell 1998, p. 10. notes other papers using this Armington assumption.
7 Our empirical work explains trade in a single year, so static models are appropriate.  In
reality, balanced trade is rare and the traded goods expenditure share reflects an
intertemporal margin of decision-making. We ignore this margin because it is remote from the
concerns of our model and seems unlikely to add to its explanatory power. Temporary trade
control measures taken for balance of payments reasons will show up in the traded goods price
index.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 10
form function in the same variables and is subsumed in the traded goods
expenditure share function. Income and population pick up the effect of
factor endowments, possible nonhomothetic preferences and possible scale
economies, while the traded goods price index picks up substitution between
traded and nontraded goods. Substituting into 2.1:
(2.2)       mij =a jpij
-sP i
s-1f yi,ni,P i ( )yi
where    ni is population and    yi  is national income.
Insecurity enters the model through its effect on prices.  The price of j ‘s
product in i will exceed the producer’s price for three reasons: a tariff if
applicable, a transport cost dependent on distance, and an “insurance”
markup which captures either the proportion of shipments lost to predators
  1-pij ( ) or the tariff-equivalent markup attributable to insecure enforcement
of contracts 











ú .  In both models of international insecurity,    pij
decreases and    mij  increases as the effectiveness of institutions for the defense
of exchange improves.
Three additional simplifications have proven enormously helpful in
moving toward an estimable model.  First, we use loglinear approximations
of the basic functions. We approximate the price markup as a log-linear
function of distance, security, and the tariff factor, if applicable.  If instead
transportation and insurance markups are modeled additively, the model
becomes deeply nonlinear. We also model the reduced form f function as
loglinear.
Second, we focus on       mij /mkj , country i’s imports from country j
relative to country k’s imports from country j,  instead of looking at    mij
directly. This makes the model invariant to multiplicative rescaling of the
WEF data, and it allows us to cancel some of the nonlinear terms of the    pij
function.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 11
More importantly, casting the model in terms of relative imports by
two different countries from a single exporter eliminates the need to estimate
the   aj  parameter.  Empirical models following Anderson’s (1979) rationale for
the gravity equation are usually misspecified.  The gravity model is derived
from the import demand system by imposing the adding up constraint that
shipments to the entire world be equal to income, solving that constraint for
the expenditure share for each exporter and finally substituting the exporter-
specific expenditure share into the import demand equation.  Anderson
shows that the correct specification of the gravity equation includes a highly
nonlinear exporter-specific price index on the right hand side. Nonlinear
structural estimation might be possible, but failing this, an exporter-specific
intercept is indicated. Unfortunately, such an intercept cannot be identified
since the model also requires other exporter-specific independent variables.
Focusing on imports by i and k  from the same exporter j eliminates this
problem.
Imposing loglinearity on the price markup and using the results of the
previous section, Equation 2.2 implies:
(2.3)
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where    aij is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the two countries
are associated in a free trade agreement and    ti  is the importer’s average ad
valorem tariff.  Through its effect on relative prices, a rise in the contract
model’s relative probability of enforcement, 
      bi /bk , would have an effect
similar to that of a rise in the predation model’s relative defensive capacity,
      S  i /S  k .
Our third simplifying move is to approximate  the relative traded
goods price indexes by a version of the Törnqvist index:Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 12
(2.4)
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where    wj  is the average across importers of the share of js product in import
expenditures.  Most previous work with gravity-type models has ignored the
price index term, which certainly results in misspecification. Our
approximation is an imperfect but sensible and operational measure.
All the major elements of our model are now in place.  We have
modeled a world in which traded goods are differentiated by place of origin.
Differences across importers in demand for a single good have two sources:
(a) differences in the price markups associated with insecurity, distance, and
tariffs, and (b) differences in the division of expenditure between traded and
nontraded goods.
3. Data
The security of transactions depends upon the institutions which
structure interaction among private firms and between private firms and the
state.   We rely on data provided by the World Economic Forum (WEF) to
measure the quality of both sets of institutions.  The measures are drawn
from the WEF 1997 Executive Survey, which was completed by more than
3000 participants distributed across 58 countries (World Economic Forum
1997, p.85).   Participants in the WEF survey were asked to assign a score
ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree) to each of the
following statements:
·  Government economic policies are impartial and transparent (Q 2.07);
·  The legal system in your country is effective in enforcing commercial
contracts (Q 8.06).
We rescale the mean response for each country to run from zero to one and
use the rescaled means as measures of institutional quality, understanding
Question 2.07 to gauge primarily the quality of interaction of the privateTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 13
sector with the state and Question 8.06 to gauge institutional support for
exchange within the private sector.
These are noisy signals of institutional strength.  Expectations differ
across countries, so that what counts as “effective” enforcement or
“impartial” policy in the Ukraine may differ from what would be similarly
classified in Singapore.  The respondents to the survey form a selected group
– even if they were randomly selected within a country, they would still
represent only those who had chosen not to relocate or to shut down.
Moreover, the Forum provides only the mean response for each country; we
lack information about within-country variation in responses.
Our data on 1996 bilateral import volumes are taken from the IMF’s
Direction of Trade Statistics.
8  Data on 1996 population and GDP in current
U.S. dollars are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI); since trade flows are measured in current dollars, GDP is measured in
the same units.  We calculate distance from capital city to capital city on the
basis of geographical coordinates listed in Fitzpatrick and Modlin (1986),
although the distance from Washington to Ottawa only roughly captures the
average distance traversed by shipments from the United States to Canada.
David Tarr and Francis Ng of the World Bank graciously provided us with
unweighted average external tariff data; these data are far more complete than
the data on import duties as a percentage of import expenditures offered by
the WDI.
9  We composed dummy variables to capture sharing a common
border, a common language, or common membership in ASEAN, the EU,
Mercosur, or NAFTA.
We have complete data on these variables for a total of 2206 import
flows distributed across 48 importing countries.  In 29 of these 2206 cases, zero
                                                
8 These statistics are generally reported cif. Eight of the countries in our sample report imports
fob.  In seven of those cases we have adjusted the flows by the cif/fob ratio of the importer’s
trade with the world as a whole, as reported in the Direction of Trade Statistics. That ratio
was not reported for the Czech Republic, whose fob import figures we adjusted upward by a
factor of 1.1.
9 Even so, not every country has data available for 1996.  We have used 1996 data where
available, but in other years have used tariff data from 1997, 1995, or 1994.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 14
imports were reported.  Table 2 shows the importing countries in our data set
and the number of import flows which we have for each.
Table 2. Importers in the Data Set
IMPORTER Obs. IMPORTER Obs. IMPORTER Obs.
Argentina 46 Hungary 47 Russia 47
Australia 47 Iceland 46 Singapore 46
Austria 47 India 47 Slovak Republic 47
Belgium-Luxembourg 47 Indonesia 46 South Africa 47
Brazil 47 Ireland 47 Spain 47
Canada 47 Italy 47 Sweden 47
Chile 41 Japan 47 Switzerland 46
China 47 Jordan 45 Thailand 44
China: Hong Kong 47 Korea 37 Turkey 47
Colombia 46 Malaysia 46 Ukraine 44
Czech Republic 47 Mexico 39 United Kingdom 47
Denmark 47 Netherlands 47 United States 47
Egypt 47 New Zealand 47 Venezuela 45
Finland 47 Norway 46 Zimbabwe 42
France 47 Peru 45
Germany 47 Poland 47
Greece 46 Portugal 47 Total 2206
4. Estimation and Results
Our analytical model leads to a simple result – relative import demand
is a function of relative income, relative population, relative distance,
relative tariffs, and the variables associated with relative security.  Estimation
of the log-linear model by OLS with robust standard errors supports three
contentions:
·  By lowering transactions costs, institutional support for secure exchange
significantly raises international trade volume;
·  Excluding institutional variables biases the estimated coefficient on
income upward, understating “home bias” in goods trade;
·  The institutional differences which we model can generate “a
disproportionately high volume of trade among high-income countries,”
a pattern “which happens to accord well with trade patterns in the realTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 15
world” (Deardorff 1998, p.16).
Equation 2.3 and the Törnqvist index described by  Equation 2.4 give us
the following model in terms of the underlying parameters:
(4.1)
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Both dimensions of institutional quality are included, assuming  that the
“defensive capacity” variable of the predation model,    S  i , involves both
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r2
.
The indicators of institutional quality do not vary across exporters for a single
importer; the “weighted average” institutional terms collapse into the
unweighted terms.  Therefore, the coefficient on each institutional index
includes its effect on the price, d2r, the direct effect of the price on imports,
-s, and the indirect effect of the price through the price index,    (s -1+ g 3).
The “weighted average” tariff markup is nearly identical to the unweighted
tariff markup, since few of the 2130 observations involve free trade, and these
two terms have also been combined.  This leaves us with:Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 16
(4.2)
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as the equation to estimate.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the import, income, population,
distance, transparency, enforceability, adjacency, language, and tariff ratios, as
defined above, using the USA as a convenient base country k.  Robustness of
the results with respect to the choice of the base is explored below.
Table 3. Ratios with USA as Base Country
Ratio: USA as Base Number Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Import Ratio 2130 0.280 0.958
Income Ratio 2130 0.080 0.173
Population Ratio 2130 0.333 0.828
Distance Ratio 2130 1.205 1.850
Transparency Ratio 2130 1.085 0.370
Enforceability Ratio 2130 0.833 0.226
Common Border Ratio 2130 1.026 0.238
Common Language Ratio 2130 0.948 0.263
Tariff Ratio 2130 1.035 0.068
Table 4 reports the results of estimating Equation 4.2 under various
restrictions.  Results in the first three columns reflect OLS estimation with
robust standard errors.  Since 29 bilateral trade flows were reported as zero,
either because they actually were zero or because they fell below a reporting
threshold, we also estimated a tobit version of the model.
10 The fourth
column presents the tobit results.
11
As shown in the first column, both of the institutional quality
                                                
10 With an elasticity of substitution among traded goods which exceeds one, high transactions
costs can eliminate trade in some bilateral pairings.
11 In this case, the value –12.2 was assigned as the log of the import ratio, ln(0).  This value is
slightly below the log of the lowest positive import ratio in the data set.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 17
variables have positive and significant coefficients.  A few examples shed
light on the magnitude of the implied effects. The enforceability of
commercial contracts is rated roughly 10% higher in Belgium than in Brazil.
Interpreting the estimated coefficient as a reduced form elasticity,  this
difference in enforceability implies 4% higher imports into Belgium than into
Brazil, other things equal.
Table 4. Relative Import Demand, USA as the Base
Variable OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 Tobit
Log Income Ratio 0.653 0.962 0.881 0.663
(0.051) (0.026) (0.039) (0.058)
Log Population Ratio 0.197 -0.132 -0.037 0.245
(0.056) (0.029) (0.044) (0.061)
Log Distance Ratio -1.106 -1.138 -1.119 -1.135
(0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043)
Log Transparency Ratio 0.548 . . 0.591
(0.095) . . (0.108)
Log Enforceability Ratio 0.407 . . 0.447
(0.124) . . (0.138)
Log Border Ratio 0.761 0.891 0.803 0.685
(0.171) (0.169) (0.168) (0.200)
Log Language Ratio 0.324 0.311 0.321 0.326
(0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.115)
Log Tariff Ratio -4.139 . -2.304 -4.488
(0.879) . (0.837) (0.958)
Weighted Log Distance Ratio 0.371 0.413 0.415 0.282
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.096)
Weighted Log Border Ratio -0.944 -1.609 -1.499 -0.948
(0.644) (0.638) (0.638) (0.925)
Weighted Log Language Ratio -0.263 1.171 1.215 0.379
(0.616) (0.593) (0.585) (0.825)
Constant -0.232 0.004 0.020 -0.169
(0.071) (0.068) (0.068) (0.107)
Number Observations 2130 2130 2130 2159
R-squared .70 .69 .69 .
Log Likelihood . . . -3933
Robust standard error in parentheses.
The mean enforceability rating among the twelve countries at the low
end of the distribution is 0.52 (relative, as always, to the rating of the USA).
The mean enforceability rating among the twelve countries in the highest
quartile of the distribution is 1.08.  A country which saw the measure of theTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 18
enforceability of its commercial contracts decline from 1.08 to .52 would see its
import volume decline 35%, other things equal.
12
The elasticity of import demand with respect to the transparency and
impartiality of economic policy is even higher.  Other things equal, imports
into France should be on average about 5.5% higher than imports into
Argentina simply because the transparency rating is about 10% higher in
France than in Argentina.
Taking both institutional indicators into account simultaneously, if the
seven Latin American countries in our sample (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) were to enjoy the same transparency
and enforceability scores as the mean ratings of the members of the European
Union, the predicted ratio of Latin American import volumes to those of the
USA would rise from .054 to .072, an increase of 34%.
13  A 57% increase in
average Latin American GDP would be necessary to generate a comparable
increase in imports.
14  Moving the seven Latin American countries in the
sample to free trade would raise their average imports by only 30%.
15
These calculations  take into account both the direct effect of insecurity
on the “insurance” markup and the substitution effects associated with the
change in price.  The price index has been included in a simple and easily
operationalized way. The signs of the parameter estimates are plausible
(implying, with reference to Equation 4.1, that g 3 <1 and s + g3 >1), and in the
case of distance-related price effects remarkably significant.  Our model of the
impact of the price index on imports implies that   
ˆ  b  3/ ˆ  b  9 , 
  
ˆ  b  6/ ˆ  b  10 , and 
  
ˆ  b  7/ ˆ  b  11
should all be equal. An F-test on the estimated coefficients does not reject that
hypothesis.
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12  The projected decline in the log of the import ratio is 0.41*(ln(1.08)-ln(0.52)).
13  The projected rise in the log of the import ratio as both institutional ratings rise to EU levels
is: 0.41*(ln(.98)-ln(.62)) + .55*(ln(1.19)-ln(.98)).
14  The .30 rise in log relative imports requires an increase of .65*ln(1.57) attributable to relative
income.
15 The projected rise in the log of the import ratio for the tariff decrease  is 4.14*(ln(1.065)).
16 The F-statistic for the joint hypothesis that   
ˆ  b  3 / ˆ  b  9 = ˆ  b  6 / ˆ  b 10  and   
ˆ  b  6 / ˆ  b  10 = ˆ  b  7 / ˆ  b  11 is
F(2,2118)=2.67.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 19
These results signal an enormous impact of institutional quality on
trade volume.  In fact, in the contemporary world poor institutions appear to
constrain trade more dramatically than do tariffs.  The estimates justify our
first and most important conclusion: by lowering transactions costs,
institutional support for secure exchange significantly raises international
trade volume.
Our second major finding is that higher income per capita significantly
reduces the share of expenditure devoted to traded goods, all else equal.
Results in the first column of Table 4 imply that a 10% rise in income per
capita will raise imports by only 6.5%; there is quantitatively and statistically
significant home goods bias.  This result stands in sharp contrast to previous
results in the gravity model literature, where traded goods expenditure shares
are nearly invariant to income, because the omission by the earlier literature
of institutional variables correlated with per capita income biases upward the
estimated income effect.  Comparison across the columns of Table 4 will
reveal the bias clearly.
The share of income spent on traded goods appears in the model as the
reduced form function        f yi,ni,P i ( )= yi
g 1ni
g 2Pi
g 3 = yi /ni ( )
g 1 ni
g 1 +g 2Pi
g 3
, with total
expenditure on traded goods given by    f yi .  Therefore, if   
ˆ  b  1  is the coefficient
on the log of the income ratio in Table 3, the elasticity of the relative trade
expenditure share with respect to changes in per capita income, g 1, is given by
  
ˆ  b  1 -1.  Inappropriately excluding the institutional and tariff variables from
the model leads to the results shown in the second column of Table 4, where
income per capita has no statistically significant impact on the trade
expenditure share (  
ˆ  b  1 -1= -.04, standard error .03).  This is the usual result.
When the tariff variable is included but the security variables are not, as in
the third column of Table 4,  income per capita has a small but significant
negative effect on the trade expenditure share (  
ˆ  b  1 -1= -.12, standard error
.04).  When the complete model is estimated, as in the first column of results,
the elasticity of the trade share with respect to per capita income isTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 20
  
ˆ  b  1 -1= -.35, with standard error of .05.
The source of the bias is correlation between the omitted variables and
income per capita.  There is a fairly strong negative correlation between
relative income per capita and the tariff ratio (-.6).  When the tariff term was
excluded, part of its negative effect was incorrectly read as a positive effect of
income, so that excluding tariffs from the model led to an underestimate of
home bias. The data show a positive correlation between income per capita
and the transparency ratio (.5) and between income per capita and the
enforceability ratio (.7).
17  Excluding these variables incorrectly attributes to
income part of the increase in trade which accompanies the traded goods price
reduction associated with good institutions, again underestimating home
bias.
Omission of these variables does not significantly bias the estimate of
the “size effect,” if population is taken as a measure of size.  In our model,
size affects imports through the traded goods expenditure share:




.  The elasticity of imports per capita with respect
to country size is given by g 1 + g2 -1.  This is estimated using the results of
Table 4  as   
ˆ  b  1 + ˆ  b  2 -1 .  The model excluding tariffs and institutional quality
estimates the elasticity of imports per capita with respect to country size as
   -.17, the model with tariffs  negative    -.16 , and the full model    -.15, all with
standard error of .02.
Our home bias result --- other things equal, doubling per capita income
reduces the traded goods expenditure share by 35% --- implies a very
significant departure from homotheticity.  This stands in contrast to the most
recent applied trade literature (Davis and Weinstein, 1998; Davis, Weinstein,
Bradford and Shimpo, 1997).  We coincide with Trefler (1995) in identifying
the importance of home bias but diverge from him in tying home bias to
                                                
17 This correlation is given in the data, but it does not imply that income per capita and
institutional quality are necessarily linked, nor does it invalidate the “thought experiment”
reported above in which institutions were improved without a corresponding increase in income
per capita.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 21
income per capita; Trefler uses income per capita as an indicator of factor-
augmenting technological differences across countries.  Our aggregate results
using the reduced form trade expenditure share bear some resemblance to
earlier disaggregated work by Hunter and Markusen (1988).
Of course, our model recognizes that the negative effect of income per
capita on the trade expenditure share could in practice be offset by a price
effect, since the better institutions and lower tariffs of the high-income
countries lower the traded goods price index. Combined income and price
effects explain why the data show a small positive correlation (.13) between
income per capita and total imports divided by GDP.
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Our final contention is that institutional differences can generate “a
disproportionately high volume of trade among high-income countries,” a
pattern “which happens to accord well with trade patterns in the real world”
(Deardorff 1998, p.16).  Why should high-income countries skew their trade
toward imports from other high-income countries – in spite of the presumed
similarity of factor endowment?  And what answer to the first question can be
consistent with the stylized fact that low-income countries do not  rely
disproportionately on imports from other low-income countries?
Several solutions to the puzzle have been proposed (notably Markusen
1986).  We offer  an explanation based on the price markup associated with
insecure trade. Effective institutions in the importing country lower
transactions costs, lower the prices of traded goods, and raise imports, holding
constant the characteristics of the exporting country.   The predation model
argues that the complete price markup also depends on the quality of
institutions in the exporting country. Our empirical results confirm that low
security in country i lowers       mij /mkj ; the predation model also implies that
both    mij  and    mkj  are low when the security of country j is low. We cannot
estimate this second effect, because the impact of the exporter’s security and of
                                                
18 The ratio of imports to GDP is not an exact measure of the traded goods expenditure share.  It
excludes expenditure on the domestically produced tradable good and includes expenditure on
goods which are re-exported.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 22
the expenditure share    aj  are not separately identified.  The prediction of the
model, however, clearly coincides with the observed pattern of trade.  Trade
among high-income countries with high-quality institutions ought to be high
because the transactions costs associated with insecurity are low; transactions
costs impose a double disadvantage on trade among low-income, low-security
countries.  This solves a problem alluded to in Deardorff’s (1998, p.16)
informal exposition of an explanation based on identical but non-homothetic
preferences.  Our story implies disproportionate trade among consumers of
the “high-income” good, but it does not imply (counterfactually)
disproportionate trade among low-income consumers.
5. Robustness
In this section we briefly examine four questions:  How do the
estimated parameters differ when the base country is changed?  How do they
differ when different indexes of institutional strength are used?  How do they
differ when lagged GDP is used as an instrument for current GDP?  Can more
general functional forms be estimated?
In theory, there is no reason to suspect that the change of the base
country k would make any difference to the parameter estimates.  In fact, we
run into two problems.  We have no data on home consumption of the
exported good.  Therefore, for any base country k, we lack a measure of    mkk .
Since we have no denominator for the relative import measure 
      mik /mkk , we
can never include any country’s imports from the base country in the sample
used in estimation.  Results could be sensitive to the exclusion of differing
sets of 47 import observations.  A second problem is tied to measurement
error.  Many of our independent variables take the form 
      ln(xi /xk).  The
measurement error associated with    xk  depends on the choice of k, so the
parameter estimates may vary with the choice of the base country.
19
                                                
19 This is also a loose justification for allowing an intercept.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 23
Table 5 presents the results of estimating the model with the USA,
Brazil, and Japan as alternative base countries.  As always, these are OLS
estimates of the model with robust standard errors. Given expected
difficulties, the results are remarkably consistent across base cases.  This is
particularly true for the coefficients on the key institutional indexes. For the
transparency and enforceability ratios, the coefficients estimated using Brazil
and Japan as the bases are well within one standard error of the coefficients
estimated using the USA as the base.
Table 5. Relative Import Demand, Alternative Base Countries
Variable USA Base Brazil Base Japan Base
Log Income Ratio 0.653 0.662 0.710
(0.051) (0.045) (0.050)
Log Population Ratio 0.197 0.179 0.119
(0.056) (0.048) (0.055)
Log Distance Ratio -1.106 -0.978 -1.126
(0.040) (0.031) (0.031)
Log Transparency Ratio 0.548 0.550 0.492
(0.095) (0.083) (0.097)
Log Enforceability Ratio 0.407 0.401 0.343
(0.124) (0.110) (0.130)
Log Border Ratio 0.761 0.939 0.704
(0.171) (0.164) (0.228)
Log Language Ratio 0.324 1.108 0.423
(0.090) (0.103) (0.148)
Log Tariff Ratio -4.139 -4.163 -3.073
(0.879) (0.732) (0.865)
Weighted Log Distance Ratio 0.371 0.292 0.466
(0.080) (0.067) (0.075)
Weighted Log Border Ratio -0.944 -0.778 -0.604
(0.644) (0.589) (0.621)
Weighted Log Language Ratio -0.263 -0.704 -0.204
(0.616) (0.345) (0.395)
Constant -0.232 0.383 0.266
(0.071) (0.051) (0.075)
Number Observations 2130 2130 2130
R-squared .70 .73 .68
Robust standard error in parentheses.
Would we find similar results if alternative measures of institutional
quality were used?  Our variables were chosen to reflect institutionsTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 24
facilitating exchange within the private sector and between the private sector
and the state.  The World Economic Forum’s survey also asked respondents
to score their agreement or disagreement with the statement:
·  Irregular additional payments are uncommon in business and official
transactions (Q 8.03).
This single statement attempts to capture the both private-private and
private-public interactions.
Shang-jin Wei has obtained from the WEF the individual respondents’
answers to this question, and he has shared with us the within-country
standard deviation of the responses. High within-country variance in
individual perceptions of corruption may indicate arbitrariness; if all
respondents agree that “irregular payments” are very frequent, then the bribe
may be treated as a known cost of doing business.  The standard deviation of
the response is an indication of the uncertainty in corruption, which may
have an independent effect on business activity.   Adjusting these statistics to
run from 0 to 1, as before, and noting that the infrequency of bribes ought to
have a positive effect on imports while the arbitrariness  should have a
negative effect, we re-estimated Equation 4.2 using the USA as the base case.
Table 6 gives the summary statistics on the new variables:
Table 6. Additional Ratios with USA as Base Country
Ratio: USA as Base Number Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Infrequency of Bribes Ratio 2130 0.732 0.264
Arbitrariness Ratio 2130 1.024 0.360
Using the logs of these ratios and estimating 4.2 again leads to the
results given in Table 7. The middle column reports the result of substituting
the bribe-based measures for the transparency and enforceability  measures.
The coefficient estimate on each has the expected sign, but the coefficient on
bribes has a low t-statistic (1.5).   This may reflect the relatively low standard
deviation of the bribe ratio across countries.  It may reflect the high
correlation between the bribe ratio and income per capita (.8).  It may reflectTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 25
measurement error.  Imprecision in capturing the security effect may well be
responsible for an upward bias on the income coefficient.
Table 7. Alternative Indexes of Institutional Quality: USA Base
Variable
Log Income Ratio 0.653 0.786 0.669
(0.051) (0.048) (0.052)
Log Population Ratio 0.197 0.046 0.175
(0.056) (0.053) (0.057)
Log Distance Ratio -1.106 -1.121 -1.103
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
Log Transparency Ratio 0.548 . 0.630
(0.095) . (0.121)
Log Enforceability Ratio 0.407 . 0.465
(0.124) . (0.132)
Log Infrequency of Bribes Ratio . 0.181 -0.316
. (0.122) (0.151)
Log Arbitrariness Ratio . -0.340 -0.083
. (0.094) (0.102)
Log Border Ratio 0.761 0.776 0.760
(0.171) (0.168) (0.173)
Log Language Ratio 0.324 0.320 0.329
(0.090) (0.091) (0.090)
Log Tariff Ratio -4.139 -2.572 -4.415
(0.879) (0.839) (0.890)
Weighted Log Distance Ratio 0.371 0.537 0.344
(0.080) (0.085) (0.090)
Weighted Log Border Ratio -0.944 -0.615 -0.762
(0.644) (0.686) (0.695)
Weighted Log Language Ratio -0.263 0.121 0.298
(0.616) (0.638) (0.650)
Constant -0.232 -0.104 -0.306
(0.071) (0.068) (0.074)
Number Observations 2130 2130 2130
R-squared .70 .69 .70
The final column of Table 7 suggests that the bribery question is simply
not the best indicator of institutional quality.  When all four measures of
institutional quality are used together, neither the infrequency nor the
arbitrariness of bribes is strongly significant (and the infrequency variable has,
if anything, the wrong sign).  The other coefficients are much as they wereTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 26
before.  This reinforces our confidence that the results presented in the earlier
section are reliable.
Table 8. Relative Import Demand, USA as the Base
Variable Base Results Instrumented
Income Ratio
Log Income Ratio 0.655 0.630
(0.052) (0.051)
Log Population Ratio 0.193 0.215
(0.057) (0.057)
Log Distance Ratio -1.111 -1.110
(0.041) (0.041)
Log Transparency Ratio 0.555 0.594
(0.097) (0.097)
Log Enforceability Ratio 0.393 0.433
(0.127) (0.126)
Log Border Ratio 0.810 0.801
(0.182) (0.182)
Log Language Ratio 0.331 0.332
(0.092) (0.093)
Log Tariff Ratio -4.102 -4.253
(0.907) (0.910)
Weighted Log Distance Ratio 0.355 0.360
(0.081) (0.081)
Weighted Log Border Ratio -1.009 -0.926
(0.668) (0.670)




Number Observations 2037 2037
R-squared .68 .68
Robust standard error in parentheses.
A full general equilibrium model of the economy would treat GDP as
endogenous, perhaps with trade encouraging growth.  This suggests that
correlation between the GDP regressor and the error term of the import
regression may have led us to biased parameter estimates.  Therefore, we
reestimated Equation 4.2 using lagged GDP as an instrument for currentTrade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 27
GDP.
20   The results, which exclude German trade due to a data problem, are
presented in Table 8.  The first column is our usual specification, the second
uses lagged GDP.  The new parameter estimates are well within one standard
error of the old and strengthen, if anything, the security and home bias effects.
A final point concerning robustness of the results:  we experimented
with more general functional forms.  We tried a translog specification of
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.  A Wald test could not
reject the hypotheses that the coefficients on all the second order terms were
jointly zero, so we returned to the log-linear specification.  We also tried to
estimate a translog as an approximation to the trade share function
     
f yi,ni,P i ( )
f yk,nk,P k ( ) but found that we could not identify all the necessary parameters
with information on 47 countries.
6. Summary and Conclusion
Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that transactions costs associated
with insecure exchange significantly impede international trade.  Predation by
thieves or by corrupt officials generates a price markup equivalent to a hidden
tax or tariff.  Insecure enforcement of contracts can have the same effect.
These price markups significantly constrain international trade where legal
systems poorly enforce commercial contracts and where economic policy lacks
transparency and impartiality.
This paper builds a structural model of import demand in an insecure
world and estimates that model using data collected by the World Economic
Forum.  We find that a 10% rise in a country’s index of transparency and
impartiality leads to a 5% increase in its import volumes, other things equal.
                                                
20  More precisely, using data from World Development Indicators, we multiplied the figure for
1995 GDP in current local currency units by the ratio of the country’s 1996 GDP deflator to its
1995 GDP deflator and converted that result to 1996 dollars using the official exchange rate.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 28
A 10% rise in the index of enforceability of commercial contracts leads to a 4%
increase in import volume. These estimates are robust with respect to the
choice of the base country.  Significant costs are associated with institutional
weakness.  They beg for serious consideration as we try to solve “the mystery
of the missing trade” (Trefler, 1995).
We find that the share of total expenditure devoted to traded goods
declines significantly as income per capita rises, other things equal. This result
stands in sharp contrast to the frequent practice of using homothetic
preferences in trade models and to recent findings that homothetic
preferences cannot be rejected by statistical tests.  The latter finding is
replicated here when tariffs and the institutional variables are excluded.
Based on this, we claim that omitted variable bias accounts for others’ failure
to reject homotheticity. The home bias effect of higher income tends to be
counterbalanced by a decline in the price index of traded goods as income per
capita rises, so that there is in the end a small positive correlation between
income per capita and import expenditure as a share of GDP.
Finally, the paper suggests an explanation for the stylized fact that high-
income, capital-abundant countries trade disproportionately with each other.
These countries are also, in our data, the countries with strong institutions
for the defense of exchange. Since the traded goods price markup depends on
the degree of insecurity in both the exporting and the importing countries,
trade among the rich countries will be relatively unhampered by security-
related transactions costs, while trade among poor countries will be doubly
disadvantaged.Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 29
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